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i 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, CORRUPTION, ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACT AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
By 
 
Nadza Kazic 
 
 
The pillars of economic development, here seen in securing property rights, enforcement of 
contract and fighting corruption, are not given proper attention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
These pillars are necessary and must be secured in order to allow firms to exist and to operate 
in the market. The research hypothesis is that a coordinated set of policies that encompasses 
property rights and enforcement of contract reforms, with the adequate fight against 
corruption, may serve to put Bosnia and Herzegovina on a solid and successful course of long 
term economic development. I approached this problem by looking into the existing legal and 
institutional system in regard to property rights, enforcement of contract and corruption. 
Moreover, I used the example of Botswana, to support the hypothesis. The results have 
shown that some fundamental laws have yet to be adopted and there is a lack of political will 
in tackling these issues.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
The 1992-1995 war damaged the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina severely. The damage 
to the economy from the war was immense in regard of the economic and production potential. 
In addition, the affects of war were felt in the technology in production area, which added 10 
years to the already existing lag of 20 years behind the developed world.  
 
More than 15 years have passed since the war ended, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is still 
struggling to get the economy on the right track. It faces many problems today. Some of them 
are corruption, unfavorable business environment, lack of an economic development strategy 
and high unemployment rate.  It is already lagging behind the development of region in many 
aspects and it must begin to develop as soon as possible to avoid completely falling behind.  
 
Attempts were made to restructure and reconstruct the economy of the country. Among others, 
the government has tried to support SME through various channels. Unfortunately,   the 
efforts did not lead to the strengthening of the private sector and thus economic development 
of the country.  
 
The government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the two entities in the 
country, has in the previous years seen the need for industrial revitalization and has therefore 
proposed the document “Project proposal of development of industrial policies in Federation 
of BiH”. It was adopted by the House of Representatives of Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2010. The project proposal defines in which direction the industry in 
Federation of BiH will develop in the next ten years. In addition, Development Strategy of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2008-2013 was created, but it has not yet been adopted 
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at the state level and the level of the entity of Republic of Srpska. 2009-2011 SME 
Development Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was created with the objective to create 
better work conditions for the SMEs. As short term priorities, coherent legal and institutional 
framework for SMEs and adoption of the SME Strategy were listed. 
 
All these government strategies and incentives might help the economic development in the 
short run, but it is debatable whether they will be successful in the long run. To achieve 
economic development in the long run, the government should focus on establishing a proper 
foundation. The foundation, seen in functioning institutions, can determine the economic 
development of a country and can account for the difference between poor and rich countries. 
Furthermore, it will provide security of property rights, contract enforcement, stimulate 
entrepreneurship, and among others, suppress corruption, thus creating a fruitful environment 
which will allow firms and industries to prosper on their own. This same foundation has not 
been properly set in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
The importance of institutions is emphasized in the Index of Economic Freedom, where they 
are considered to be one of the 12 pillars of competitiveness. One of the most important issues 
covered within the institutions pillar is the issue of property rights. It evaluates to what extent 
the private property rights are protected by laws as well as the degree to which its government 
enforces those laws.
1
 In the 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
ranked 129
th
 out of 142 countries, indicating that the property rights are weakly protected. 
Certain progress has been made in terms of time it takes to register property, shortening it 
from 84 to 33 days, but that is far from securing property rights.  
                                                 
1
 The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal: 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, 
http://www.heritage.org/Index/ (Accessed October 1, 2011). 
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Weakly protected property rights are interlinked with corruption and enforcement of contracts. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. It ranked 91 out of 
178 countries analyzed in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
2011.
2
  Corruption is present in everyday life and leads to inadequate functioning of political 
and economic institutions. In addition, the number of procedures for enforcing contracts is 37 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 being the least number of procedures a country has. The 
duration of disputes lasts astonishing 595 days.   
 
In the World Bank’s “Doing Business Report 2012”, Bosnia and Herzegovina was ranked at 
125
th
 position for ease of doing business.
3
 When comparing the data from the region, only 
Kosovo was ranked worse. FYR Macedonia is leading in the region when it comes to starting 
a business, with only 3 days necessary to start a business in Skopje, whereas in Sarajevo, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, it takes 40 days to start a business. This can and does affect the 
economic development of the country as well as the region.  
 
The countries with secured property rights, contract enforcement, and less complicated 
bureaucracy will have more new businesses emerging, and thus will develop faster. Moreover, 
if a country in the region has a more favorable environment for starting a business, and is 
among others successful in fighting corruption, entrepreneurs from other countries might 
consider opening their businesses and contribute to the development of that particular country.  
 
All this affects the business environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus economic 
development. Many people refrain from starting a business in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to 
                                                 
2
 Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/  (Accessed April 20, 2012). 
3
 The World Bank :Doing Business 2012, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB12-
FullReport.pdf  (Accessed April 15, 2012). 
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the unstable business environment. If property rights are not secured, if one cannot enjoy the 
fruits from his labor, then there is no incentive to go into business. Property rights must be 
secured in order for firms to operate in the market. Moreover, if it is difficult to enforce a 
contract, if the process takes too much time, it will as well negatively affect their decision to 
start a business.  
 
The incentives the government provides for firms and industries will not generate long term 
economic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without the proper foundation which 
would allow for firms to grow and be profitable on their own, long term development will not 
be possible. Without proper foundation, seen in secure property rights, contract enforcement 
and suppressed corruption, Bosnia and Herzegovina will not develop in the long run. My 
research hypothesis is that a coordinated set of policies that encompasses property rights and 
enforcement of contract reforms, with the adequate fight against corruption, may serve to put 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on a solid and successful course of long term economic development. 
 
To investigate this hypothesis, I will look into existing legal and institutional system in regard 
to property rights, enforcement of contract and corruption and analyze whether they are 
hindering the economic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, I will look 
into existing SME strategies, development strategies and projects regarding industrial policies 
to analyze what was recognized by the government as the impediment to the development of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and whether they have proposed a solution to the problem.  
 
In support of my hypothesis, I will use the example of Botswana, which serves as a successful 
example of how a proper foundation established affects the economic development of a 
country. Botswana is one of the most developed countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa, and this 
5 
 
is due to the fact that companies and individuals do not need to fear of property appropriation 
and do not need to offer bribe in order to help their own business. 
 
Chapter 2 - Literature review 
 
 
Previous research acknowledges that the role of institutions is vital for economic development. 
Functioning institutions, among others, need to provide security of property rights, contract 
enforcement, stimulate entrepreneurship, and suppress corruption. The quality of institutions 
can determine the economic development of a country and can account for the difference 
between poor and rich countries. 
 
The development of Bosnia and Herzegovina has stagnated and is in fact lagging behind the 
region. It is precisely these property rights, corruption and contract enforcement which are 
important for the development of the country. The hypothesis of my paper is that a 
coordinated set of policies that encompasses property rights and enforcement of contract 
reforms, with the adequate fight against corruption, may serve to put Bosnia and Herzegovina 
on a solid and successful course of long term economic development. 
 
The first segment of the literature review will concern the issue of property rights and 
allocation of resources. The second segment of the literature review covers the issue of the 
importance of institutions on the economic development, more specifically, the importance of 
property rights, corruption and enforcement of contract. This literature review attempts to 
demonstrate and support my hypothesis.  
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2.1 Property rights and allocation of resources  
 
 
Many economists have recognized the importance of property rights. Adam Smith (1776) 
wrote in Wealth of Nations: “Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any 
state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel 
themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contract is not 
supported by law…”4. He emphasized the importance of law for the economic development 
and prosperity of a country and why it is necessary to secure the property rights and enforce 
contracts for better business operations.   
 
In Road to Serfdom, Friedrich A. Hayek wrote: “What our generation has forgotten is that the 
system of private property is the most important guarantee of freedom, not only for those who 
own property, but scarcely less for those who do not“.5 He explained that individuals can only 
decide what to do on their own when the control of the means of production is divided among 
people who act independently. When the economic power is centralized, in hands of the state, 
individuals would not be able to act independently. He further explained that in a country 
where there is enforcement of the Rule of Law, i.e. a state of order in which events conform to 
the law, individuals can follow their personal goals, without fearing the government will 
intervene.  
 
When addressing the problem of externalities, the economist Ronald Coase claimed that when 
transaction costs are equal to zero and when property rights are properly defined, it will have 
no affect on the allocation of resources. It would only affect the distribution of income and 
                                                 
4
 Smith,Adam, Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence Vol. 2a „An Inquiry Into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations“, Vol. 1 (1776); edition used: An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, Vol. I ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, vol. II of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981). 
5
 Hayek, Friedrich A., The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 103–4. 
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wealth between the involved parties. In this case, involved parties can reach an agreement on 
their own, without the involvement of a legal system, and both parties could gain from it.  
 
In reality, the transaction costs are never equal to zero. Coase explained: “In order to carry out 
a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to 
inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up 
to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the 
terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely 
costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried 
out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost”. 6 
 
Since the transaction costs are not equal to zero, the importance of institutions and legal 
systems rise to the surface.  
 
“... Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is clear that 
such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of 
production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be 
involved in bringing it about…In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal rights does 
have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates. One arrangement 
of rights may bring about a greater value of production than any other. But unless this is the 
arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs of reaching the same 
result by altering and combining rights through the market may be so great that this 
optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production which it would bring, 
may never be achieved“. 7 
                                                 
6
 Coase, Ronald H, „The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960). 
7
 Ibid. 
8 
 
 
In the case when transaction costs are positive, the affected parties would turn to the legal 
system for solving the issue, since the outcome depends of the allocation of rights.  The main 
problem concerning resources, when it comes to Coase, is that they are not owned by 
someone. Moreover, disputes over the use of resources could be resolved if the resources 
were given as private property.  
 
The importance of property rights and allocation of resources was also identified by Besley 
and Ghatak (2009) as well as Libecap (1989). Besley and Ghatak questioned what determines 
property rights and the mechanisms through which property rights affect economic activity. In 
their paper, they claimed that where the property rights are not secured, there will be an 
inefficient allocation of resources.
8
 Moreover, Besley and Ghatak explained that property 
rights are not exogenously given, as it is believed by mainstream economists, thus, they 
evolve over time. Property rights are driven by economic and political forces and these forces 
must be taken into account to ensure that property rights are well-defined and enforced.
9
 
 
Libecap also claimed that property rights matter and affect the economy. He stated that 
property rights affect economic behavior through incentives.
10
 Moreover, they can shape the 
economic behavior by assigning ownership to resources.
11
 Property rights can have public 
goods aspect if such reduced transaction costs and thus encourage investment.  
 
 
                                                 
8
 Besley, Timothy J. and Ghatak, Maitreesh, Property Rights and Economic Development (March 2009). CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. DP7243. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Libecap, Gary D., "Property rights in economic history: Implications for research," Explorations in Economic 
History, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 227-252, July 1986. 
11
 Libecap, Gary D. Contracting for Property Rights, New York: Cambridge University Press (1989). 
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Savoia et al. (2004) have done empirical studies on the effect democracy and inequality (of 
land and income) have on quality of institutions. They concluded that property rights and 
economic institutions are affected by income inequality and democracy. Moreover, 
democracy was positively correlated to property rights and economic institutions.
12
  
2.2 Property rights, corruption, enforcement of contract and economic 
development 
 
 
Many studies were conducted to support the premise that sound institutions cause higher 
economic growth. Glorious Revolution which occurred in the 17
th
 century in England is 
recognized as a revolution which redistributed political power. Redistributed political power 
was hence followed by institutional changes, which led to strengthening of property rights, 
thus leading to economic growth.
13
  
 
Property rights enforcement is widely recognized as one of the main characteristics of sound 
institutions. Acemoglu stated that secure property rights provide encouragement for 
companies and individuals to take risks and invest.
14
 A study conducted by Knack and Keefer 
has as well shown that property rights have an impact on investment and growth.
15
 
 
In his book “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance“, Douglass North 
asserted the importance of institutions for the long-term economic development of a country. 
He stated that the quality of institutions directly affects the economic performance of a 
country and whether the economy will be successful or will fail. North further emphasized the 
importance of contract enforcement: “the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost 
                                                 
12
 Savoia, A., J. Easaw, and A. McKay“The Relationship between Inequality and Institutions: An Empirical 
Analysis,” Department of Economics and International Development Working Paper, University of Bath (2004). 
13
 North, Douglass C. and Barry Weingast (1989) “Constitution and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional 
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England”, The Journal of Economic History, 49/4: 803-832. 
14
 Acemoglu, Daron: “Root Causes: A historical approach to assessing the role of institutions in economic 
development.” In Finance and Development (F&D), June 2003, Volume 40, Number 2. 
15
 Knack, Steven and Philip Keefer.“Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using 
Alternative Measures,” Economics and Politics, 7, 207-227 (1995). 
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enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and 
contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World”.16 He stated that the lack of secure 
property rights and contract enforcement will deter investments in the country, hence leading 
to weak growth rates and inefficient economy. North also explained that in order to assure 
contract compliance, a third-party is necessary to enforce it and by “third-party enforcement”, 
he means “the development of the state as a coercive force able to monitor property rights and 
enforce contracts effectively”.17 
 
Questions have arisen in which way corruption can affect the economic development of a 
country. Aidt (2009) analyzed whether corruption “sands“ or “greases“ the wheels of 
development.  Using the example of de Soto’s experiment18 – examining the length it takes to 
obtain permits legally to start a small tailoring business to show why the economic activity 
was forming in the informal sector -- and Uganda’s example of the low amount of public 
funds which reached the intended destination, he clearly showed that the corruption affects 
economic development negatively.
19
 He emphasized that while corruption can in some 
occasions “grease” the economy – by helping companies in certain situations, in most 
instances it is an impediment to development and can lead to misallocation of resources. 
 
An informal sector is created when among others, property rights are weak.
20
 Individuals 
choose to work in the informal sector because the weak institutions cannot provide them with 
a sound environment for their economic activities. Barro (2000) went further and explained 
                                                 
16
 North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 De Soto, H, „The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World“,  New York, Harper (1990). 
19
 Aidt, Toke S, Corruption, institutions, and economic development, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
Volume 25, Number 2 (2009)  pp.271–291. 
20
 Barro, Robert J.  “Rule of Law”, Democracy, and Economic Performance, in Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Kim R. 
Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick, 2000 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage 
Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2000), p. 36. 
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that corruption is not always unacceptable, since it may lead to positive economic activities 
which could have been suppressed under certain regulations. Still, many economists agree 
that corruption hinders the economic development of a country. Where there are weak 
institutions and corruption, the number of economic activities which could be accomplished 
legally is reduced, and eventually it will affect the economy.     
 
Analyzing the causes behind wealth disparity between nations, Roll and Talbott (2001) 
discovered that wealth disparity was mostly caused by factors governments could actually 
change. Those factors were, among others, property rights, regulation, political rights, black 
market activities and government expenditures. Entrepreneurs cannot change these 
determinants by themselves and thus, effective government is necessary in their provision and 
enforcement. Their empirical studies have shown that there is strong correlation between per 
capita income, and property rights, black market activity and regulation, showing the highest 
level of significance.
21
 In order to develop faster, countries must enforce strong property 
rights, and tackle issues such as corruption and overwhelming regulation.  
 
Robert Hall and Charles Jones conducted empirical studies testing why productivity varied 
across nations. They have come to a conclusion that the variations in productivity can be 
explained by the differences in institutions and government policies, i.e. social 
infrastructure.
22
 A favorable social infrastructure enables firms and individuals to acquire 
skills, make investments and produce goods and services. To explain the difference in the 
development levels between countries, Acemoglu and Robinson also pointed out to the 
                                                 
21
 Roll, Richard and Talbott, John. “Why Many Developing Countries Just Aren’t“. The Anderson School at 
UCLA, Finance Working Paper No. 19-01. (2001). 
22
 Hall, Robert, and Charles Jones. 1999. “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much 
More Output per Worker Than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 1: 
83–116. 
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quality of institutions - to be more specific, to the evolution of property rights.
23
 To support 
this statement, they used the example of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the 
Republic of Korea. While private property was neglected in the centrally planned economy of 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it was protected under the capitalist Republic of 
Korea. In addition to the secure property rights, investments were encouraged, thus supporting 
the economic development and leading to rapid growth. Today, the Republic of Korea is one 
of 20 largest economies in the world, whereas the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is 
still struggling with economic growth.   
 
Dani Rodrik explained that poor countries lack among others an outline of property rights 
system, rule of law and functioning government. The lack of the same is what separates the 
developed from poor countries.
24
 Rodrik also pointed out what characteristics sound 
institutions should poses: “Desirable institutions provide security of property rights, enforce 
contracts, stimulate entrepreneurship, foster integration in the world economy, maintain 
macroeconomic stability, manage risk-taking by financial intermediaries, supply social 
insurance and safety nets, and enhance voice and accountability.”25 He further explained that 
sound institutions are necessary for the market to function and that even minor institutional 
reforms could have an impact on the economic growth.  
 
Chafuen and Guzmán (2000) analyzed how corruption affects property rights. They claimed 
that corruption makes property rights insecure and thus affects economic development. 
                                                 
23
 Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James."The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development,” (2010) in 
Leadership and Growth, ed David Brady and Michael Spence 135-64, Washington, DC: The World Bank on 
behalf of the Commission on Growth and Development. 
24
 Dani Rodrik, 2000. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They are and How to Acquire Them," NBER 
Working Papers 7540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
25
 Dani Rodrik, 2008. "Second-Best Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, 
vol. 98(2), pages 100-104, May. 
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Furthermore, they have conducted empirical studies that have shown that there is negative 
correlation between economic freedom and corruption.26  
 
Adam Smith (1776) said that trade, and hence an economy, cannot grow when contracts are 
not supported by the law and enforcement of contracts is not effective.
27
 The enforcement of 
property rights and thus, enforcement of contracts, can be affected by a corrupt bureaucracy.
28
  
Acemoglu and Verdier (1996) stated: ”For the state to have a role in enforcing property rights, 
some contractual problems must exist between private parties.... production requires two 
agents, and one of the entrepreneurs needs to undertake an investment, but the returns accrue 
to the other one...The effort of the first agent has to be rewarded, and this necessitates a 
contractual arrangement.”29 The government is required to enforce contracts, because without 
the support of the government, the entrepreneur cannot rely on the other entrepreneur’s word 
regarding executing his obligations. If the bureaucrats in charge of enforcing the contract are 
corrupt, the bureaucrat will be more likely to make an unprincipled decision. In such an 
environment, the entrepreneur is less likely to do business.  
 
To conclude this literature review, it can be assumed that property rights, corruption and 
contract enforcement play an important role in the economic development of a country. Many 
researchers have conducted empirical analysis and proven that they affect the economic 
                                                 
26
 Chafuen, Alejandro and Eugenio Guzman. 2000. “Economic Freedom and Corruption,” In 2000 Index of  
economic Freedom, edited by Gerald O’Driscoll Jr., Kim Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick. Washington, D.C.: 
Heritage Foundation.  
27
 Smith,Adam, Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence Vol. 2a „An Inquiry Into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations“, Vol. 1 (1776); edition used: An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, Vol. I ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, vol. II of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981). 
28
 Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General 
Equilibrium Approach," Working papers 96-5 (1996), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department 
of Economics.  
29
 Ibid.  
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development. The lack of the same represents an impediment to the economic development of 
a country and therefore is necessary for the country to make progress, develop and grow.   
Chapter 3 - The Complex Structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is administratively divided into two autonomous entities: the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51%) and the Republic of Srpska (49%). Additionally, 
the area around the town of Brčko has received the status of District. The Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is an integral part of the General Framework Peace Agreement for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 4), better known as the "Dayton Agreement", which was 
initialed on November 22, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio and signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris. 
With this Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina was transformed in to a complex and 
decentralized government structure consisting of two entities - the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shares a common central government, but legislative and executive 
power is exercised at the entity levels.
30
 The legal system is also non-transparent and 
uncoordinated. Corruption is present in every segment. Furthermore, by creating the two 
entities within one country, two separate economic spaces have been created. Attempts to 
make progress towards creating the single economic space have been limited.  
 
This all affects the decision of entrepreneurs when considering starting a business in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. For the development of the country, it is necessary to create a single 
                                                 
30
 German Development Cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation 
and Development, 
http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/europa_udssr/bosnien_herzegowina/index.html (Accessed, 
November 14, 2011). 
15 
 
economic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will support free movement of goods, 
capital and services.  
 
3.1 Economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the poorest republics in the former Yugoslavia. Its GDP 
was 70% smaller than the GDP of Slovenia, which was the most developed republic. The 
economy was centrally planned. It focused on large public enterprises whereas private 
enterprises were not recognized during the socialist period. Industrial production was 
concentrated in 12 large companies, focusing on mechanical, metal and chemical industries 
among others.
31
 
 
The 1992-1995 war damaged the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina severely, with total 
losses estimated at over $110 billion. The damages were the greatest in regard to production 
potential, destruction of economic potential and infrastructure (road and rail networks, 
telecommunications, etc). War had an impact on the economy not only in terms of destroyed 
infrastructure, but also in terms of loss of markets -domestic and foreign. During the time it 
was a part of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina exported over 50% of its production to 
other Yugoslav republics.
32
  
 
In 1991, the technology in the production area in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed a lag of 20 
years behind the developed world, while the additional technological lag caused by the war in 
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the period 1992-1995 was estimated at 10 years.
33
 Additional problem the country was faced 
with during the war as well as today is brain drain. Almost 60% of scientists with a technical 
education have left the country.
34
  
 
The transition process from a centrally planned economy to a market economy had already 
been started in the late 1980s and 1990s in Eastern Europe, but the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina halted the transition process until the war ended in 1996. After the war, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina started with restructuring and reconstructing the economy. One of the main 
issues was prioritizing small and medium enterprises over the large public enterprises which 
were common in the socialist era.
35
 The government has tried to support SME through various 
channels, but the results were unsatisfactory. All the efforts did not lead to the strengthening 
of the private sector and thus economic development of the country. 
 
Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered an open economy. The GDP per capita (based 
on PPP) in the year 2010 was $7,816 slightly increasing from $7,659 in 2009. The Report of 
Country Partnership Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina specified the shares of value added: 
“Some 65 percent of value added is created in service sectors (retail trade, public 
administration and financial services, etc.) while the remaining 35 percent is split between 
manufacturing, 25 percent (industry, construction and energy production); and agriculture 10 
percent”.36  
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Regarding trade, it is mostly conducted with EU member countries and countries from South 
East Europe. The main export products are: base metals, products of mineral origin, 
machinery, mechanical and electrical equipment, wood products, products of chemical 
industry, food products and transport equipment, while the main import products are products 
of mineral origin, machinery, mechanical and electrical equipment, base metals, products of 
chemical industry, food products, transport equipment, wood and wood products. 
 
Analysis of exports and imports in accordance to their economic purpose shows that in most 
cases Bosnia and Herzegovina exports and imports intermediate products, with the share 
being 41.7% and 29.5% respectively. Furthermore, mostly imported are non-durable 
consumer goods 26.2% and capital goods 16.4%. 
 
In the period 2000-2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina was running trade deficit. According to the 
data of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, during the same period the total amount 
of exports grew from 2.05 billion KM to 6.88 billion KM. In addition, total amount of imports 
grew from 7.64 billion to 16.32 billion KM, increasing the trade deficit from 5.58 billion KM 
to 9.42 billion KM. Only in 2008, the trade deficit had increased for 1.32 billion KM.
37
  
 
The economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina went through a recession in 2009, following the 
global financial crisis of 2008. The economic growth dropped by 9 % in 2009, from 5.7% to   
-3.1% in 2009. Job creation was halted and the unemployment rate stayed at a very high level, 
around 40%. Furthermore, it slowed down the poverty reduction in the country. In 2009, the 
trade deficit declined by 29.4%. The decline was a result of decrease of domestic imports and 
not as a result of improved position of Bosnian products in the foreign markets.
38
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The economy showed slight improvement in 2010, recovering to 0.8% and is expected to 
reach 2.2% in 2011. The improvements were mostly a consequence of increased foreign 
demand, thus increasing exports to these foreign markets. Exports amounted to 7.03 billion 
KM in 2010, increasing by 28.7 % compared to previous year. Imports increased by 10.2%, 
amounting to 13.61 billion KM, leading to a decrease in trade deficit by 4.5 % to 6.51 billion 
KM. Overall, the recovery from recession was slow, with an increase in unemployment, 
making cuts in public-sector wages and social welfare benefits to restrain the budget deficit.
39
  
 
Chapter 4 - Efforts of the government to improve the economic 
development of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
 
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is attempting to improve the economic development 
of the country by creating various strategies, such as the Development Strategy of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, SME Development Strategy, projects regarding industrial policies, etc.  
 
Development Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was created by the Directorate for 
Economic Planning of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2008 – 2013. The Development 
Strategy is based on creating a competitive economy aimed at increasing employment, 
following the principles of sustainable development and macroeconomic stability with greater 
social justice. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this Development Strategy has not yet 
been adopted at the state level and the level of Republic of Srpska, only at the level of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the District of Brcko. Sense of future adoption at 
the state level is questionable since it is already 2012.  
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In the Development Strategy, the importance of strengthening productivity and competition of 
domestic economy is emphasized through: 
 
- Completion of privatization by the end of 2013; 
- Restructuring of state-owned enterprises and privatized firms; 
- Reducing the tax and non-tax burden on the economy, especially regarding contributions; 
-  Increasing the mobility of the labor market; 
- Reducing the informal economy as well as other forms of unfair competition; 
- Improving the business climate, particularly in the area of greater investment protection  
(acceleration of the process of contract enforcement and increase the efficiency of the 
courts).
40
 
 
One of the biggest challenges of Bosnia's economy is its competitiveness. It is one of the least 
competitive countries in Europe. The Development Strategy refers to the “Doing Business” 
indicator, where they draw the conclusion that enforcement of contract, property registration, 
starting a business and getting a credit are among the main reasons for the weak 
competitiveness of the Bosnian economy. In the Strategy, they go further on explaining that 
the legal framework for conducting economic activities is not developed and briefly mention 
that investment and trade will be jeopardized, unless the property rights and enforcement of 
contract were secure. Although they recognized these barriers, they do not go into details 
proposing specific measures how to improve these impediments to the competitiveness of the 
economy.  
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One of the priorities for improvement of macroeconomic stability is the improvement of 
foreign trade. According to the Strategy, measures to be taken for the realization of the 
priority are: 
 
- Encouragement of restructuring, modernization and standardization of operations and 
product development in accordance to the requirements of the key foreign markets; 
- Policy development of  strategic products; 
- Strengthen the support for exporters. 
 
The last two measures require state interference in terms of favoring one product over another, 
as well as giving financial incentives to exporters. Regarding the strategic product, they state 
that it is necessary to stimulate the production of goods and services which are not made (or 
not made sufficiently enough) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and are therefore imported. 
Furthermore, the production surpluses would be placed on international markets. As for the 
exporters’ support, the Strategy emphasizes the necessity to financially support current and 
potential exporters, whether it is by tax incentives, guarantees, insurance, financial schemes, 
etc.  
 
To support these measures and the export promotion policies, the example of Korea was used 
and how the import substitution policy in the 1950s only led to 2-3% growth, whereas export 
promotion in the 1960s led to over 7% of economic growth. Unfortunately, the economic 
growth of Korea was not government-led as it is widely believed.
41
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The export expansion in Korea happened much before the government decided to pursue 
export promotion policies. In fact, it happened after the Korean Won devalued three times at 
the beginning of the 1960s. That resulted in an expansion of manufactures exports, thus 
leading to a change in policies – export promotion replaced import substitution. The switch to 
export promotion was not something that the government planned, but it was rather a decision 
they made seeing the result of already increased exports.  
 
2009-2011 SME Development Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was created with the 
objective to create better work conditions for the SMEs. As short term priorities, coherent 
legal and institutional framework for SMEs and adoption of the SME Strategy as well as 
establishment of SME Agency were listed. Most countries in Western Balkans except Bosnia 
and Herzegovina already have an SME Agency.  
 
The objectives mentioned in the SME Development Strategy are very broad and general, such 
as: “Stimulate growth through targeted support to high-growth, innovative and export-
oriented SMEs“; “Improve the business support environment (legal and financial environment, 
institutional business support infrastructure)“; “Provide incentives to new businesses across 
all sectors of the economy“; “Improve competitiveness of SMEs on domestic and foreign 
markets“, etc.42 No one can certainly deny the importance of these general objectives. The 
problem is that they do not provide specific objectives or measures on how to reach these 
goals.  
 
The SME Strategy also lists the laws and regulations which should be adopted in order to 
support to SMEs. Laws such as the Law on Registration, the Law on Accounting and 
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Auditing (both only needed to be reviewed and modified), the Law on SME Promotion and 
Entrepreneurship, the Law on Statistics and the Law on Companies of entities and Brcko 
District are seen as a necessity for the development of SMEs and the normal conduct of 
business.  
 
The Law on Property Rights, which at the time of creating the Strategy was not yet adopted in 
the Republic of Srpska, and is still not adopted in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
cannot be found on the list. Moreover, throughout the whole Strategy, the issue of corruption 
and enforcement of contract and the impact it has on entrepreneurship is not mentioned. It can 
be concluded that the government considers property rights as given, and moreover does not 
consider weak property rights, enforcement of contract and corruption to be an obstacle for 
SME development.    
 
Another attempt of the government to boost the development of the country are projects 
concerning industrial policies. In 2010, the House of Representatives of Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina adopted the document “Project proposal of development of industrial 
policies in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” highlighting the need for industrial 
revitalization in the entity. The project proposal defines in which direction the industry in 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will develop in the following ten years. Among others, 
it elaborates how the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be positioned in the market 
and how it will find the funds for future funding of industrial projects.  
 
The Republic of Srpska developed the project “Strategy of Industrial Policies of Republic of 
Srpska” already in the year 2000. The project was initiated on the basis of the Declaration of 
the Peace Implementation Council conclusions (Madrid Declaration) and the Program of the 
23 
 
Ministry of Industry and Technology of the Government of the Republic of Srpska. The role 
that exports have in the economic growth of a country is undeniable. The problem arises when 
one is using export promotion and other industrial policies to reach that goal. Whether they 
are using subsidies, import tariff exemptions, tax breaks, or cheap credit to promote certain 
industries, it has been difficult to prove the significance of these measures.
43
 No matter how 
many successful cases of industrial policies exist, there are as many failures – and they are not 
gladly discussed.  
 
It is also questionable whether the government would be competent enough to successfully 
target the “winning” industries. They could also be keen in favoring industries due to certain 
special interest they have.
44
 It could all lead to failed industries and thus, wasted resources. 
Moreover, inefficient government intervention can also lead to government failure. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that this cannot be a permanent solution for the long-term 
development of the country.  
Chapter 5 - Property rights, corruption and enforcement of contract in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
In this part of the paper I will analyze how property rights, corruption and enforcement of 
contract affect the business environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus affect the 
economic development of the country. The factor of property rights has been chosen as an 
indicator of business environment, since the securing of property rights is of great importance 
for the sustainability of the economic development. Corruption and enforcement of contract is 
interlinked with property rights and must be taken into account when analyzing the business 
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environment. Enforcement of contracts is considered a necessity in guaranteeing integrity in 
the market. Furthermore, countries with good contract enforcement produce and export more 
products than countries with poor contract enforcement. 
45
 
5.1 Property rights  
 
The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom has among others the indicator for 
property rights. In the Index of Economic Freedom, they emphasize the importance of 
property rights stating: “Secure property rights give citizens the confidence to undertake 
entrepreneurial activity, save their income, and make long-term plans because they know that 
their income, savings, and property (both real and intellectual) are safe from unfair 
expropriation or theft“. 46 In the Index of Economic Freedom 2011, property rights freedom in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was ranked 146 out of 183 countries. This low ranking means that 
property rights are unreliable.  
 
Figure 1:  2011 Index of Economic Freedom -  Property Rights Chart: Bosnia and Herzegovina and World Average 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2011) 
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The International Property Rights Index (hereinafter: IPRI), in-depth international 
measurement of property rights, consists of three components: Legal and Political 
Environment, Physical Property Rights and Intellectual Property Rights. It placed Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 113th place of 129 countries. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina was placed 
in the bottom 10 in the Physical Property Rights component together with countries such as 
Chad, Ukraine and Bangladesh. 
 
Figure 2:  2011 International Property Rights Index for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Source: IPRI 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina showed certain improvements in Judicial Independence, Registering 
Property and Access to Loans subcomponents, which raised the Legal and Political 
Environment and Physical Property Rights component and thus raising the IPRI of the 
country. The result is nevertheless worrying and should raise concerns. 
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The Law on Property Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is supposed to be harmonized 
at the state level, has been adopted only in the Republic of Srpska in November 2008 and is 
applied since January 2010. This law marks the biggest reform in the area of property and 
legal matters. 
47
 It extensively regulates the issue of property rights. It is stated that this law: 
“re-establishes the principle "superficies solo cedit" i.e., the unity of the property, unimodality 
of property rights, introduces new property rights, land debt and rights to construction, exerts 
the conversion of rights arising as a result of socialization (the right to use, disposal and 
management) to the right of ownership and revokes an enormous number of valid 
regulations”.48  
 
The Law on Property Rights Relations has existed in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the larger of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two entities, since 1998. There has been 
substantial change in this field since 1998, and the purpose of the Law on Property Rights, 
which is already adopted in the Republic of Srpska, is to fully and in one place regulate the 
right of ownership right as the fundamental property right. The adoption of the Law on 
Property Rights is slow, where only the draft of this law has been adopted by the House of the 
People of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 2011. The stalling of 
adoption of such laws causes damage to the business environment. Additionally, inequality 
between the entities regarding the adopted laws, creates a favorable environment in one part 
of the country, and thus, could cause businessmen to consider starting a business in the entity 
which has a better environment for them.  
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Certain progress has been made in the land registry administration. The reform in this area has 
led to the reduction of numbers of procedures necessary for registration of real estate. 
Furthermore, old land registries and cadastral records have been digitalized, resulting in 
decreasing the time it takes to register property from 331 days in 2008 to 33 days in 2011 in 
the city of Sarajevo, and from 145 days in 2008 to 117 days in 2011 in Mostar. 
49
 The reform 
of property registration since then has been lagging.  
 
5.2 Corruption 
 
Corruption is considered to be one of the impediments to development in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina ranked 91 out of 183 countries in the Corruption 
Perception Index 2011 of Transparency International. Moreover, in the Transparency 
International’s 2010 Global Corruption Barometer, 59% of interviewees believed that the 
corruption has increased in the past three years in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
50
 Additionally, 
they believed that the anti-corruption actions of the government were ineffective.  
 
Corruption is related to the distortion of the business environment. The business/private sector 
received a rating of 3.6 (1 meaning not corrupt at all and 5 extremely corrupt) in the 2010 
Global Corruption Barometer. It shows that the corruption is perceived as relatively high in 
institutions dealing with business matters.  
 
In the year 2000, the World Bank did extensive research on corruption. Their report “Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption”, covered three surveys where 700 public 
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officials, 350 enterprise managers, and 1,200 individuals were interviewed. 
51
 The report has 
shown that corruption imposes a financial burden for firms and loss of time when dealing with 
bureaucracy issues.  
 
Table 1: Bribe reported by entrepreneurs in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Type of service 
Mean amount of bribe  
(in KM, 1 KM = 0,51129 EUR)  
as reported by entrepreneurs 
To get connected to and maintain public services (electricity, 
telephone)  288 
To get licenses and permits  463 
To deal with taxes and tax collection  609 
To gain government contracts  504 
To deal with customs/imports  601 
To deal with courts  216 
To deal with health/sanitation/fire inspectors 120 
Source: World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption 
 
The average amount of bribe entrepreneurs had to give in 2000 was between 120 KM and 609 
KM. In addition to the financial aspect of corruption, entrepreneurs had to spend a certain 
amount of time dealing with the bureaucracy. Corruption is also seen as an obstacle for 
acquiring licenses, permits and certificates which are necessary for firms. 
52
 
 
Corruption in the legal and regulatory process, unpredictability of legal and policy 
environments and changes in government economic policies were all seen as impediments to 
development of the business environment and increase business risk. Private firms were more 
vulnerable to unpredictability and changes than public firms since public firms are better 
connected and better informed. This makes public firms more prone to influencing policies. 
53
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The survey which was conducted among entrepreneurs for the research paper, “Enterprise 
Policy Performance Assessment: Bosnia and Herzegovina”, showed that 70% of 
entrepreneurs were not aware of government programs aimed at tackling the issue of 
corruption. This suggests that a problem of poor implementation of these programs exists. 
Moreover, it shows that these programs had little or no impact in fighting corruption.   
 
In 2009, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2009-2014 and accompanying Action Plan 
were adopted. The Strategy defines the overall objectives of the fight against corruption and 
the required resources and methods of implementation, while the Action Plan identifies 
measures that are needed to be implemented, along with naming responsible institutions and 
deadlines for implementation. Furthermore, the Law on the Agency for Corruption Prevention 
and Co-ordination of the Fight against Corruption was adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in late 2009. This law establishes the Agency whose 
objective is preventing the impact of corruption on development of democracy and respect for 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. Additionally, the objective of the Agency is to 
prevent the undermining of economic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to 
coordinate the fight against of corruption. The Agency should be independent and self-
governed, and should act on behalf of or with consent of the court.  
 
At first glance, it seemed Bosnia and Herzegovina was finally ready to address the issue of 
corruption more thoroughly and take necessary steps in fighting it. The 2011 Progress Report 
of the European Commission has shown otherwise. The Progress Report indicates that all the 
findings are repeated each year, and thus are ignored by the authorities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Other problems are that the laws aimed at fighting corruption are not 
harmonized at different government levels; delay in implementation of the Strategy exists as 
30 
 
well as unfamiliarity of institutions with the Strategy. 
54
 What causes all these problems is the 
lack of political will in combating the issue of corruption.  
 
There have been many problems with establishing the Agency for Corruption Prevention and 
the Co-ordination of the Fight against Corruption. Within the first year of establishment, the 
Agency had done nothing concrete – it had no executive power, employees, and among others, 
did not adopt rules of procedures. The finally elected administration of the Agency was 
appointed by political lines.
55
 This could jeopardize the future work of the Agency which can 
fall under the control and influence of parties.   
 
5.3 Enforcement of Contract 
 
 
The enforcement of contract indicator in the Doing Business Report of the World Bank 
measures the number of procedures which are necessary to enforce contracts through courts, 
as well as the time and cost of completing the procedures.
56
 In the 2012 Doing Business 
Report, Bosnia and Herzegovina was ranked 125 out of 183 in ease of enforcing contracts. It 
is next to countries such as Kenya, Jamaica and Côte d'Ivoire. In a commercial dispute, 37 
procedures are required to enforce contracts through courts, 595 days to complete the 
procedures and it would cost an astonishing 40% of the claim, with 20,7% being the EU 
average. What is worrying is that no reform has been done in this field for the past 4 years 
which would make enforcement of contracts easier.  
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The property rights freedom of the Index of Economic Freedom also includes contract 
enforcement. The 2011 Report stated that the judicial system in Bosnia and Herzegovina does 
not cover commercial activities adequately, contracts are unenforceable and court decisions 
are difficult to enforce. 
57
  
 
Commercial courts, which could speed the process of contract enforcement, exist only in 
Republic of Srpska, one of two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The District Commercial 
Courts were established by the Law on Changes of the Law on Courts and started with work 
in May 2010. By establishing these commercial courts, it allowed for commercial courts to 
take over jurisdiction from the Basic Court, and thus making progress in enforcement of 
contracts. The positive changes of these commercial courts can be seen in the shortening of 
the filing period for commercial claims from 6 months to a month and a half, and reducing the 
enforcement period to less than 400 days. 
58
  
 
In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, commercial disputes are handled in municipal 
courts which have set up special commercial departments. But these commercial departments 
lack in court staff and a problem of backlog of unresolved cases exists. These are just some 
issues which entrepreneurs face in this entity.  
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Table 2 bellow shows the flow of commercial cases in the municipal and basic courts in 2009: 
 
Table 2: Case flow of commercial cases in the municipal and basic courts in 2009 
Commercial 
cases 
No. of 
unresolved 
cases as of 
1.Jan.2009  
I 
No. of cases 
received in 
2009 
II 
Total no. of 
cases 
processed in 
2009 
III = I + II 
No. of cases 
resolved in 
2009. 
IV 
No. of 
unresolved 
cases as of 
31.Dec.2009 
V = III - IV 
Commercial 
cases 13812 9275 23087 9514 13573 
Small value  
commercial 
disputes 8398 7620 16018 4950 11068 
Liquidation cases 1457 1431 2888 1384 1504 
Ex officio  
liquidation 
procedures 0 73 73 71 2 
Bankruptcy 
procedures 565 359 924 337 587 
Other 8 0 8 4 4 
Total 24240 18758 42998 16260 26738 
Source: The 2009 Annual Report of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
The tables show an overwhelming number of unresolved cases. In most cases, the number of 
unresolved cases at the beginning and end of the year is almost the same, which suggests that 
the court is inefficient in handling all the cases and is lacking in number of court personnel 
which could help reduce the number of case backlogs. 
 
In order to improve court administration and strengthen enforcement procedures through 
mediation, technical assistance was provided by the World Bank, SEED and USAID. 
Furthermore, the Law on Mediation was enacted in 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It 
defines the process of mediation, the principles and the role of mediator in the process, and 
deadlines, if the judicial proceedings are in progress.   
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Mediation was introduced as an alternative to solve business disputes - as an alternative to the 
expensive and inefficient court procedures, but this out-of-court settlement method has not 
been used often. Such methods of dispute settlement could shorten the time of procedure and 
save money for both parties which are important and valuable for business performance. 
Furthermore, it could decrease the number of cases which end in discontinuation of business 
relationships.  
 
While mediation can be successful in easing the burden of the courts, it should not completely 
substitute for the judicial system. The government should not rely only on alternative dispute 
settlement procedures, but should rather still work on making the judicial system more 
efficient.  
Chapter 6 - Significant empirical studies demonstrating the 
importance of property rights, contract enforcement and corruption 
in economic development  
 
 
Due to the nature of the subject of the paper, it was difficult to test the hypothesis by 
conducting empirical research on the case of economic development in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Therefore, in order to support my hypothesis, I relied on previous empirical 
studies on the significance of institutions and on the successful example of Botswana’s 
economic development. 
  
Many empirical studies were conducted proving the importance of institutions for the 
economic development of a country. Institutions play a vital role in providing a favorable 
environment for stimulating entrepreneurship by securing property rights and among others, 
enforcing contracts.  
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A study conducted by Knack and Keefer (1995) showed that secured property rights and 
contract enforcement have an effect on investment, thus affecting the economic growth of a 
country. To research this matter, they used variables from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI). ICRG variables referred to: 
"Corruption in Government," "Rule of Law," "Expropriation Risk," "Repudiation of Contracts 
by Government," and "Quality of the Bureaucracy".
59
 Low scores on Rule of Law and 
Expropriation Risk indicate reduction in investments due to the investor’s fear of possible loss 
of investments. Scoring low in Corruption in Government and Quality of the Bureaucracy 
indicates lack of competence and misallocation of public goods. Moreover, it increases the 
likelihood of property appropriation. The last variable, Repudiation of Contracts by 
Government, represents as well a constraint to economic activities. The BERI index consisted 
of "Contract Enforceability," "Nationalization Risk," "Infrastructure Quality“ and 
"Bureaucratic Delays".
60
  
 
Prior to their research, most research focused on the Gastil measures of political freedom and 
measures used by Barro (1991), mainly being measures of political instability. Knack and 
Keefer believed these indexes were not good representatives of measures of institutions used 
to explain economic performance and that it was better to use more specific indicators of 
property rights and contract enforcement. 
61
   
 
Empirical analysis showed that institutions that protect property rights were correlated with 
economic growth. When investments were controlled for, institutions still had a significant 
effect on growth, emphasizing the effect property rights had on allocation of inputs. Moreover, 
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Knack and Keefer explained that discouraged investments are a result of violated property 
rights, which ultimately obstructs economic growth. 
 
One of the most important empirical studies which was influenced by Knack and Keefer’s 
findings was conducted by Robert Hall and Charles Jones. Using the example of United States 
and Niger in the year 1988, they pointed out that the output per worker in the United States 
was 35 times higher than output per worker in Niger. Hall and Jones questioned why output 
per worker varied enormously between countries. They claimed in their paper that 
“differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are 
fundamentally related to differences in social infrastructure across countries“, defining social 
infrastructure as “the institutions and government policies that determine the economic 
environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and 
produce output“. 62  Moreover, a favorable social infrastructure enables firms and individuals 
to acquire skills, make investments and produce goods and services. 
 
The extensive research of Hall and Jones included 127 countries with data for the year 1988. 
The data consisted of data on output, labor input, average educational attainment, and 
physical capital.
63
 In addition, they have created an index of social infrastructure, consisting 
of an index of government anti-diversion policies and an index of openness to international 
trade. The government anti-diversion policies index incorporated following measures: law and 
order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of 
contracts. 
64
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Figure 3: Social Infrastructure and Output per Worker 
 
Source: Hall, Robert, and Charles Jones. Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker 
Than Others?” 
 
The empirical analysis Hall and Jones have conducted has shown that output per worker was 
positively correlated with social infrastructure. Furthermore, their empirical analysis has 
shown that while the level of education and differences in physical capital explain only to a 
certain degree the variation in output per worker across countries, the variations can be better 
explained by the social infrastructure.  
 
While the government can successfully provide a social infrastructure and encourage product 
activities, it can also have a negative impact and hinder country’s development. Through 
predation in the form of corruption, property expropriation and confiscatory taxation, the 
government can negatively interfere in the business environment. Where the social 
infrastructure is weak, individuals will be reluctant to start a business and it will affect their 
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incentive to invest.  Overall, a country with better social infrastructure will develop faster in 
the long run and thus have a higher GDP.  
 
Roll and Talbott (2001) questioned what causes wealth disparity between nations. Their 
research included data for the period 1995- 1999 from sources such as The Index of Economic 
Freedom, Freedom House, World Bank and CIA Factbook. Variables which were included in 
the study were property rights, black market activities, political rights, regulation, civil 
liberties, trade barriers, inflation, government expenditures and freedom of the press. 
Additionally, they used GNI per capita as a measure of economic well-being, stating that it is 
more reliable than using growth.  
Table 3 Cross-Country multiple regressions of GNI per capita on fourteen determinants 
 
Source: Roll, Richard and Talbott, John. “Why Many Developing Countries Just Aren’t” 
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Table 3 shows Cross-country multiple regressions of GNI per capita on fourteen determinants 
with the bordered entries denoting a significance level of at least 95%. Furthermore, the 
empirical analysis has shown that over 80 percent of GNI per capita variations between 
nations can be explained by variables they have used. There is strong correlation between per 
capita income, and property rights, black market activity and regulation, showing the highest 
level of significance.
65
 They further go on explaining that with secure property rights, 
favorable environment would be created for entrepreneurs. Moreover, with secure property 
rights, economies of developing countries could develop on their own, without much external 
help. Entrepreneurs also tend to be cautious when considering investing in states where 
property rights are not protected due to likelihood of property expropriation. Black market 
activities are one of the consequences of weak property rights. Roll and Talbott’s research has 
also shown that GNI per capita was negatively correlated to excessive regulation, affecting 
the decision of entrepreneurs whether to go into business or not.  
 
Factors which caused the wealth disparity among nations is something which governments 
can actually change. Roll and Talbott emphasized in the paper: “Once a developing country 
government establishes the rules to a fair game and ensures their enforcement, it would be 
well advised to stand back and enjoy the self-generating growth”.66 Government is a key 
player in providing and enforcing these rules, which among others include strong property 
rights, tackling issues such as overwhelming regulation, black market activities and corruption, 
thus enabling entrepreneurs to conduct their businesses properly.  
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6.1 Supporting evidence: Successful case of Botswana’s economic 
development 
 
 
Botswana serves as a perfect example of how a proper foundation established affects the 
economic development of a country. With $14,000 GDP per capita (PPP) (2010 est.)
67
, it is 
one of the most developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Figure 4: GDP per capita (PPP) for 10 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (in US  dollars) 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 
 
In 2010, the GDP per capita (PPP) for Sub-Saharan Africa was only $ 2,258.02. Figure above 
shows the GDP per capita for 10 Sub-Saharan African countries. As seen, Botswana’s 
economic performance outranks the performance of most Sub-Saharan African countries. 
How did Botswana become one of the most developed countries in that region? Unlike many 
of their neighboring countries, Botswana chose to follow the ideas of market economy and 
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securing property rights for the people. By doing that Botswana has had impressive economic 
growth rates for many years (est. 8.6% in 2010).
68
  
 
The success of Botswana is a result of long-term effort of the government to secure property 
rights and strengthen the institutions. The political elite of Botswana includes among others 
cattle owners and tribal actors, and they have certainly contributed to adoption of policies and 
laws in favor of securing land rights.  
 
The legal framework covering land issues consists of formal and customary laws, ie laws 
which are based on traditions and customs. It is dedicated to ensuring property rights. Since 
there are 38 tribes in Botswana it was very important that “The Tribal Land Act“ and “The 
Tribal Grazing Lands Policy“ were included within the legal framework. With “The Tribal 
Land Act”, authority was transferred from chiefs to land boards and thus enabled citizens to 
be able to lease the tribal land for commercial purposes. “The Tribal Grazing Lands 
Policy“ concerns the privatization of grazing land and is very important since it enables 
citizens to lease parts of formerly unfenced, communal land.
69
 
 
In the 2012 Doing Business Report, Botswana was ranked 54, with the Sub-Saharan Africa 
average being 137. Most of the Sub-Saharan African countries performed poorly and can be 
found at the very bottom of the Doing Business Report. Majority of those African countries 
are characterized by weak legal institutions as well as expensive and less efficient regulatory 
processes, thus affecting the property rights protection.   
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In the component of ease of registering property in the 2012 Doing Business Report, 
Botswana was ranked 50, with only Ghana and Sudan ranking better from all Sub-Saharan 
African countries. The cost of transferring property in Botswana is expensive, consisting of 5% 
of the value of purchase price. Lowering these costs in the future will contribute to creating a 
favorable business environment, and thus improving their ranking in the Doing Business 
Report.  
 
Botswana was also ranked 38 in the 2011 International Property Rights Index, placing it right 
next to countries such as South Korea and Israel. Within the Sub-Saharan region, it was 
outranked only by Mauritius. The Physical Property Rights component of the IPRI which 
includes Protection of Physical Property Rights, Registering Property and Access to Loans, 
received 7.2 out of 10 points, making improvements since 2010. All other Sub-Saharan 
African countries, except South Africa, are ranked behind Botswana, with Zimbabwe being 
the worst, ranking at 128
th
 place.  
 
Land reform in 2000 in Zimbabwe, Botswana’s neighboring country, has led to seizure of 
property rights.  It caused foreign direct investment to drop immensely and many companies 
to close their business.
70
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Figure 5: GDP per capita in Zimbabwe for the period 1999 – 2010 (in US dollars)  
 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 
 
Since the land reform has been implemented in 2000, the GDP per capita of Zimbabwe has 
dropped from $2,500 to $500 in 2010. During the same period, the GDP per capita of 
Botswana has increased from $6,600 in 2000 to $14,000 in 2010.  
 
Figure 6 GDP per capita in Botswana for the period 1999 – 2010 (in US dollars) 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 
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Zimbabwe is not the only country battling property appropriation. The problem of illegal 
fencing of communal land exists in Namibia. It is conducted by certain Namibian elite for 
their personal use, and it is affecting communal farmers.
71
 Government support in battling this 
issue is lacking and there have been no prosecutions in the case of illegal fencing.  
 
Many will pinpoint this success of Botswana due to their wealth in natural resources such as 
diamonds. It is true that they have affected the economic development of Botswana and its 
expansion, but many other countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa are as well rich in natural 
recourses but are not as developing as fast as Botswana. Others will link the economic 
development to the institutions which were left behind from the period of British colonization. 
Most of African countries were as well colonized, which shows that the colonization is not the 
main reason of economic development of Botswana. The main reason can be seen in property 
rights and how they are highly regarded in Botswana. This has among others allowed foreign 
investors to invest safely in the country without fear of property appropriation. Another 
reason is the attitude towards corruption.   
 
Botswana is the least corrupt country in Africa according to the 2011 Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index, ranking it at 32 out of 183 countries.  
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Table 4: 2011 Corruption Perception Index for Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country 2011   Country 2011 
  Africa 
Rank 
World 
Rank 
CPI 
Score 
   Africa 
Rank 
World 
Rank 
CPI 
Score 
     
Botswana 1 32 6.1  Sierra Leone 15 134 2.5 
Cape Verde 2 41 5.5  Cameroon 15 134 2.5 
Mauritius 3 46 5.1  Eritrea 15 134 2.5 
Rwanda 4 49 5 
 
Niger 15 134 2.5 
Seychelles 5 50 4.8 Togo 16 143 2.4 
Namibia 6 57 4.4  Uganda 16 143 2.4 
South Africa 7 64 4.1  Comoros 16 143 2.4 
Ghana 8 69 3.9  Mauritania 16 143 2.4 
Lesotho 9 77 3.5  Nigeria 16 143 2.4 
Gambia, The 9 77 3.5  Côte d'Ivoire 17 154 2.2 
Zambia 10 91 3.2  Kenya 17 154 2.2 
Liberia 10 91 3.2 
 
Zimbabwe 17 154 2.2 
Swaziland 11 95 3.1 Guinea-Bissau 17 154 2.2 
Tanzania 12 100 3  Congo, Rep. 17 154 2.2 
Madagascar 12 100 3 
 
Central African Republic 17 154 2.2 
Malawi 12 100 3  Guinea 18 164 2.1 
Burkina Faso 12 100 3  Angola 19 168 2 
Benin 12 100 3  Congo, Dem. Rep. 19 168 2 
Gabon 12 100 3  Chad 19 168 2 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 12 100 3 
 
Equatorial Guinea 20 172 1.9 
Senegal 13 112 2.9  Burundi 20 172 1.9 
Mozambique 14 120 2.7  Sudan 21 177 1.6 
Ethiopia 14 120 2.7           
Source: Transparency International 
 
The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC), Botswana's corruption 
investigation body, was established in 1994. It focuses on investigating allegations of 
corruption, preventions of corruption with emphasis on educating the public about 
corruption.
72
 Since 2000, their frame work was extended to investigating money laundering.  
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So far DCEC has been very successful, especially in encouraging and engaging citizens in 
reporting corruption anonymously. The number of reports received in 1994 was 254, 
increasing every year and reaching 1851 reports received in 2010. A response team was 
established and case inspections were introduced to deal with the increasing number of 
reports.
73
 Cases which were investigated concerned mostly issues such as illegitimate 
allocation of land, bribe and procurement.
74
 Challenges emerge in the form of slow court, 
leading to a slowdown in resolving cases. That being said, it still has had a high conviction 
rate
75
.  
 
There are some areas where the business environment in Botswana could see improvements. 
Enforcement of contract is one of them. The main problem is seen in the length of a 
commercial dispute process in Botswana. According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business 
Report”, it takes 625 days to resolve a commercial dispute, with 654,80 being the Sub-
Saharan Africa average. There have been no reforms for the past two years in that field. Many 
commercial cases are settled through arbitration and it is expected that the trend will increase. 
Just as in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, commercial courts do not exist, and their 
establishment could speed up the process of resolving commercial cases.  
 
Many objections can arise to the proposal of economic development based on secure property 
rights and enforcement of contract, and which is free of corruption. The basis of all problems 
is lack of political will, particularly in combating corruption. Political will can be described as: 
“the demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society 
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watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a 
systemic level“. 76  In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Agency for Corruption 
Prevention and Coordination of the Fight Against Corruption though established, has done 
nothing significant yet. Additionally, the competence of elected staff comes into question as 
they could be inclined to make decisions which would be in interest of the political parties 
which appointed them. The fight against corruption should be aimed at anyone regardless of 
their status or position and regardless of the extent of the corruption, and to do that, the 
Agency should not be under the influence of any political party. Therefore, it is necessary to 
make the work of the Agency transparent and effective as it is in Botswana. 
 
Overall, many countries, even Bosnia and Herzegovina, can learn from Botswana’s 
experience. By focusing on strengthening institutions and creating efficient regulatory 
environment, Botswana has made it easier for entrepreneurs to start and grow a business. It 
has furthermore created an environment where entrepreneurs do not need to fear of property 
appropriation and do not need to offer bribe in order to help their own business. In a region 
such as Sub-Saharan Africa where most of the poorest countries in the world originate from, 
Botswana serves as a success story and it has proven that secure property rights and absence 
of corruption are important for a development of a country.  
Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
This paper set to investigate how property rights, corruption and enforcement of contract 
affect the business environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus affect the economic 
development of the country. The economic development is affected and influenced in many 
ways, but secure property rights allow for entrepreneurs to enjoy the fruits from their labor. 
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Corruption and enforcement of contract is interlinked with property rights and for that were 
taken into account when analyzing the business environment.  
 
After the literature review, the structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina was explained, together 
with the economy of the country. One of the main impediments of the country’s structure to 
the development is seen in two separate economic spaces, which complicates doing business 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still recovering from the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis and is battling with high unemployment.   
 
The government has tried to support SME through various channels, among others creating 
SME Development Strategy. The Law on Property Rights is not among the laws which they 
considered were necessary for the SMEs, and thus had to be adopted. Throughout the whole 
Strategy, the issue of corruption and enforcement of contract and the impact it has on business 
environment is not mentioned. Industrial policies are another attempt of the governments of 
entities to develop the country, but cannot be considered a long term solution to the economic 
development. The 2008 - 2013 Development Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though not 
yet adopted at the state level and in the Republic of Srpska, proposes some measures which 
interfere with the ideas of free market. Those would include favoring one product over 
another, as well as giving financial incentives to exporters. Even though the government has 
tried to facilitate economic development by creating these strategies, it has not yet been 
successful for various reasons.   
 
The issues of property rights, corruption and enforcement of contract in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were analyzed separately. The property rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
unreliable and not secure. The Law on Property Rights has only been adopted in the Republic 
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of Srpska and is still waiting to be enacted in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The 
land registry administration has made progress by digitalizing old land registries and cadastral 
records. Corruption is seen as one of the biggest factors of impediments to development in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the Agency for Corruption Prevention and Co-ordination 
of the Fight against Corruption was established, it has not begun fully operating. Another 
problem represents the elected administration appointed by political lines. Contract 
enforcement procedures are very slow in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lack of commercial courts 
in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and lack of court staff are a major problem, 
causing accumulation of unresolved cases.  
 
In order to support my hypothesis – a coordinated set of policies that encompasses property 
rights and enforcement of contract reforms, with the adequate fight against corruption, may 
serve to put Bosnia and Herzegovina on a solid and successful course of long term economic 
development, I used the example of Botswana. Botswana lies in one of the least developed 
areas in the world- Sub-Saharan Africa, and yet has a GDP per capita (PPP) of $14,000. 
Moreover, the GDP per capita (PPP) for Sub-Saharan Africa was only $ 2,258 in 2010. This 
achievement can be attributed to the functioning institutions in Botswana, which provide a 
sound environment for doing business. They secure the property rights, which enables 
companies and individuals to freely conduct business, without the fear of property 
appropriation. Botswana’s neighboring country Zimbabwe, conducted land reforms in 2000, 
which led seizure of property. Many companies have closed their business since, and the GDP 
per capita dropped from $2,500 to $500 in 2010. In addition to secure property rights, 
Botswana is the least corrupt country in Africa. The Directorate on Corruption and Economic 
Crimes in Botswana has been very successful in tackling the issue of corruption, placing great 
emphasis on educating the public.  
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While it is true that the natural resources of Botswana have contributed to the economic 
development of the country, they are not the main reason of Botswana’s success. Moreover, 
many other countries in the Sub-Saharan region are as well rich in natural resources, but have 
not yet been successful in reaching the level of economic development as Botswana did. The 
main difference between Botswana and most of the other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa lies 
in the institutions which provide secure property rights, contract enforcement and fight 
corruption. 
 
Overall, the main problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be seen in the lack of political will 
in tackling these issues. The administration of the Agency for Corruption Prevention and Co-
ordination of the Fight against Corruption serve as marionettes for their political parties; 
property rights are taken as given and backlog of immense unresolved cases exist.  
 
Lack of secure property rights is an obstacle to successful entrepreneurship in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Securing property rights is an imperative condition for establishment of a 
healthy business environment. It encourages domestic and foreign enterprises to engage in 
entrepreneurship. More businesses would improve employment rate and contribute to 
economic development of the country. The issue of property rights should be approached 
simultaneously with problems of corruption and contract enforcement. Weak contract 
enforcement cost a lot of money the entrepreneurs. All this affects the decision of the 
entrepreneur whether he will engage in doing business in the first place. For that reason it is 
necessary to establish a healthy environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina which will secure 
property rights, enforcement of contract and is dedicated to fighting corruption.  
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